At the same time the American leadership was being pressured by the British to commit to an invasion of North Africa. .
Committing US forces to a North African invasion carried significant risks: .
First there was the risk of alienating the Soviets. The North Africa invasion would do nothing to provide any relief to the Soviet Union in their fight against the Germans -- something that opening a "second front" on the continent would have accomplished. President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill had both committed the Allies to a second European front in 1942; a commitment that Soviet Marshal Stalin demanded be kept. It was important for the Allies that the Soviets remain in the war; the Russian front was tying up a large number of German units -- units that could be transferred to other operations if the Soviet Union fell. An additional blow to Allied commitments to the Soviets was the reduction in war materials being sent to the Soviet Union -- materials vital to the war effort. The British had halted shipments on the Artic route to Archangel because of German submarine and air attacks from Norway. In the end, despite Soviet curses and insults about an English yellow streak and "reluctance to fight on the ground" no second front was opened on the European continent in 1942 and the North Africa campaign was initiated.
Secondarily, for American forces to participate in the invasion of North Africa, Operation Torch, it would be necessary to divert men and material from both Great Britain, where the pre-invasion force for the cross-channel operation was being constituted. When necessary material could not be located in British warehouses it was the shipped from the United States. The diversion of soldiers from American units in Great Britain reduced several American divisions to such low manning that it would require six to eight months to restore the divisions to their proper level of efficiency.